A Note on the Strength of Disentangled Truth-Theories

Abstract

So-called `disentangled' truth-theories are supposed to prevent assumptions about the truth of statements in the object-language from inadvertently strengthening the background syntax. In earlier work, I proved some limitative results in an attempt to show that the strategy works, but those results leave several questions unanswered. We address some of them here. We also discuss a subtlety that has so far been overlooked in discussions of these theories.

Find it here: https://philpapers.org/rec/HECANO-6

This is another short paper that is a kind of appendix to an in-progress paper on the question whether there are or could be epistemically potent proofs of consistency. It may be submitted to a journal like Thought or Analysis at some point.

Some Remarks on 'Logical' Reflection

 Abstract:

Cezary Cieśliński has proved a result shows that highlights `logical reflection': The principle that every logically provable sentence is true. He suggests further that this result has a good deal of philosophical significance, specifically for the so-called `conservativeness argument' against deflationism. This note discusses the question to what extent Cieśliński's result generalizes, and just how strong `logical reflection' is, and suggests that the answers to these questions call the philosophical (though not the technical) significance of Cieśliński's result into doubt.  

On my website: http://rkheck.frege.org/pdf/unpublished/CieslinskiNote.pdf

On PhilPapers: https://philpapers.org/rec/HECSRO

This is a short paper, under 4000 words, which I will probably submit to Thought or Analysis. But mostly it's a kind of appendix to an in-progress paper on the question whether there can be a 'cogent' consistency proof. That one will be posted before long.