Abstract
So-called `disentangled' truth-theories are supposed to prevent assumptions about the truth of statements in the object-language from inadvertently strengthening the background syntax. In earlier work, I proved some limitative results in an attempt to show that the strategy works, but those results leave several questions unanswered. We address some of them here. We also discuss a subtlety that has so far been overlooked in discussions of these theories.
Find it here: https://philpapers.org/rec/HECANO-6
This is another short paper that is a kind of appendix to an in-progress paper on the question whether there are or could be epistemically potent proofs of consistency. It may be submitted to a journal like Thought or Analysis at some point.
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