Truth, Reflection, and Implicit Commitment

 New paper, forthcoming in a volume on the foundations of mathematics. Abstract:

The 'Implicit Commitment Thesis' (ICT) states that, if you accept a mathematical theory, then you are 'implicitly committed' to its consistency, and perhaps also to various sorts of reflection principles. This is meant to have various consequences, such as that consistency proofs can never be cogent: give us reason to believe that a theory is consisetent. I here consider a sampling of arguments for ICT and argue that they are all wanting. At the end, I suggest that we should, anyway, think of soundness proofs, in particular, not as attempts to justify reflection principles but as attempts to explain why they are true. 

Get it here. 

This is the paper for which the two short notes posted earlier, "A Note on the Strength of Disentangled Truth-Theories" and "Some Remarks on 'Logical' Reflection", are essentially appendices. 

A Note on the Strength of Disentangled Truth-Theories

Abstract

So-called `disentangled' truth-theories are supposed to prevent assumptions about the truth of statements in the object-language from inadvertently strengthening the background syntax. In earlier work, I proved some limitative results in an attempt to show that the strategy works, but those results leave several questions unanswered. We address some of them here. We also discuss a subtlety that has so far been overlooked in discussions of these theories.

Find it here: https://philpapers.org/rec/HECANO-6

This is another short paper that is a kind of appendix to an in-progress paper on the question whether there are or could be epistemically potent proofs of consistency. It may be submitted to a journal like Thought or Analysis at some point.